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DEMOCRACY AND THE DOMINANCE OF 
DELAWARE IN CORPORATE LAW 
KENT GREENFIELD* 
I 
INTRODUCTION 
Delaware has a population less than one-third of one percent of the nation, but it is 
the state of incorporation for more than fifty percent of U.S. public companies and 
more than sixty percent of the Fortune 500.1  Delaware’s resulting dominance over the 
terms of corporate governance in the United States has been the subject of one of the 
grandest and most persistent debates within corporate law scholarship.  Still the ques-
tion remains whether Delaware’s dominance has been the result of, in William Cary’s 
famous phraseology, a “race to the bottom”—toward a legal regime that benefits man-
agers at the expense of the shareholders2—or a “race to the top”—toward an efficient, 
shareholder-centric governance framework.3  The conventional wisdom is that if the 
result is a race to the bottom, then Delaware’s dominance is illegitimate and a federal 
chartering statute is appropriate.  If the result is instead a race to the top, its dominance 
simply flows from its success in providing the best, most efficient set of governance 
laws available.  Delaware’s dominance is, in other words, a laudable result of the 
“genius of American corporate law.”4
This essay will argue that this debate, as popular and notable as it is, is largely be-
side the point.  Even if Delaware’s dominance is a race to the top resulting in a corpo-
rate law framework that efficiently serves the interests of shareholders, it is still ille-
gitimate. This is because Delaware’s ability to define the rules of corporate 
governance depends on the so-called “internal affairs” doctrine, which provides that 
Copyright © 2004 by Kent Greenfield 
 This Article is also available at http://law.duke.edu/journals/lcp. 
 * Professor of Law, Boston College Law School. 
 The author thanks the participants in the Fourth Annual Public Law Conference at Duke University School 
of Law, December 2002, for their helpful comments.  The author also received very helpful suggestions from 
participants in faculty colloquia at Boston College Law School and UCLA Law School.  Particular thanks to 
Adam Winkler, Lynn Stout, Jim Cox, Stephen Bainbridge, David Rothman, and Scott FitzGibbon.  The author 
also thanks Brendan Murphy and Scott LaFranchi for excellent research assistance. 
 1. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, Vigorous Race or Leisurely Walk: Reconsidering Com-
petition Over Corporate Charters, 112 YALE L.J. 553, 553-54 (2002). 
 2. William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663, 666 
(1974) (using phrase “race for the bottom”). 
 3. See, e.g., Daniel R. Fischel, The “Race to the Bottom” Revisited: Reflections on Recent Developments 
in Delaware’s Corporation Law, 76 NW. U. L. REV. 913, 919-20 (1982) (using phrase “climb to the top”).  For 
another possibility, namely that state competition produces a race to the top in some issues and a race to the bot-
tom in others, see Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Federalism and the Corporation: The Desirable Limits on State Com-
petition in Corporate Law, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1435, 1440 (1992). 
 4. ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW 1 (1993). 
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the rules governing the internal affairs of a corporation (that is, the rules of corporate 
governance) originate from the state in which the corporation is chartered.  This is in 
contrast with conflict-of-laws principles that apply in all other areas of law.  Typi-
cally, the state with the greatest interest in regulating the behavior in question provides 
the governing law.  But under modern incorporation statutes, a corporate charter is ex-
tremely easy to obtain, and there is no requirement of any meaningful contact whatso-
ever with the chartering state.  Thus, corporations can, in effect, choose which corpo-
rate governance laws will apply to them, regardless of whether they have any other 
contact with the state whose laws they choose.  This ability of corporations to elect 
their governance law is illegitimate as a democratic matter and inefficient as an eco-
nomic matter. 
A. Delaware’s Dominance 
Delaware’s dominance is staggering.  Over 300,000 companies are incorporated 
there, including nearly three hundred of the Fortune 500.  In contrast, the state incor-
porating the second largest number of Fortune 500 companies (New York) has only 
twenty-five.  In fact, so many companies incorporate in Delaware that incorporation 
and franchise fees provide one-quarter of total state revenues.5
But Delaware has little contact with these corporations besides being the jurisdic-
tion that provides the corporate charter.  Of the thousands of corporations incorporated 
there, only a few have significant numbers of employees or shareholders in the state.  
Only two Fortune 500 companies, DuPont and MBNA, are headquartered in Dela-
ware.6  More importantly, even though Delaware has less than 820,000 citizens,7 its 
corporate governance rules govern companies with millions of employees.  The three 
hundred largest companies incorporated in Delaware employ over 15 million people, 
only an infinitesimal fraction of whom actually reside there.  The number of employ-
ees at Wal-Mart, the largest company incorporated in Delaware, is fifty percent larger 
than the population of the entire state.8  Furthermore, Wal-Mart’s total net sales in 
their last fiscal year, $244.5 billion,9 were more than six times the entire Gross State 
Product of Delaware.10
B. The Internal Affairs Doctrine 
Perhaps this would not be so striking if “internal affairs” meant only the narrow 
relationship between managers and the company.  But because companies affect so 
many stakeholders, and because even the most “internal” rule has implications for 
 5. Jonathan Chait, Rogue State, THE NEW REPUBLIC, August 19, 2002, at 20. 
 6. Largest U.S. Corporatations, 147 FORTUNE, April 14, 2003, at F1. 
 7. U.S. Census Bureau statistics, available at http://www.census.gov/popest/states/tables/NST-EST2003-
01.pdf. 
 8. See id.; Largest U.S. Corporations, supra note 6, at F1. 
 9. 2003 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. Annual Report, available at 
http://www.walmartstores.com/wmstore/wmstores/Mainnews.jsp?pagetype=news&categoryOID=8775&catID=
-8248&template=DisplayAllContents.jsp#. 
 10. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, REGIONAL ECONOMIC 
ACCOUNTS, available at http://www.bea.doc.gov/bea/regional/gsp/; see also supra note 6, at F1. 
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these stakeholders, it is impossible to claim that internal affairs are immaterial to any-
one other than shareholders and managers.  Examples abound.  Other stakeholders un-
doubtedly are affected by a rule that directors should maximize profit to shareholders, 
or a rule that directors should not disclose information to communities about their 
business practices absent a legal or financial imperative, or a rule that shareholders 
need not pay the debts of the corporation. 
Indeed, the state law of fiduciary obligation itself—arguably the most “internal” of 
all rules—provides that directors owe duties of care and loyalty to shareholders.  In so 
doing, obligations toward other stakeholders are excluded.11  Thus, that workers are 
not represented on the boards of directors for the vast majority of companies incorpo-
rated in the United States is not the result of some element of labor law or federal se-
curities law.  Rather, this is a consequence of the state law of corporations.  Clearly, 
one cannot avoid the difficulties of the internal affairs doctrine by claiming that only 
shareholders and managers are affected by it. 
The key problem is that Delaware law, in the process of establishing the rules that 
govern the internal workings of corporations chartered in the state, reaches beyond its 
borders to affect all stakeholders in a corporation.  This includes those who have no 
political influence over the status, terms, or requirements of the law.  Delaware law 
can therefore be crafted without attention to the political influence of many important 
stakeholders; unless, of course, that influence can be transformed into market terms.  
The internal affairs doctrine thus allows Delaware to externalize the costs of its rules 
on other stakeholders and indeed other states. 
This practice of deferring to Delaware law to govern most of the nation’s largest 
and most powerful corporations is undemocratic.  Indeed, if areas of the law can be 
evaluated on their susceptibility to democratic or political pressures, then corporate 
law must be among the least open to political influence.  In a democracy, this should 
be seen as a serious flaw in the framework of corporate law. 
The internal affairs doctrine, which dictates this awkward result, is a foundational 
principle “wholeheartedly embraced” by the corporate law academy and bar because 
of its seeming “irresistible intuitive appeal.”12  Despite its foundational status, or per-
haps because of it, the doctrine attracts scholarly attention only sporadically.13  Fierce 
defenses are infrequent, but forceful attacks rarer still.14  Nevertheless, the doctrine de-
serves more attention, especially in a time of growing public distrust in the methods of 
corporate governance and increasing attention on the issue of corporate accountability. 
The internal affairs doctrine is a special case in the doctrine of conflicts of laws.  
Typical conflicts of laws principles are complex, but they generally suggest that the 
state with the greatest interest in regulating the behavior in question should provide 
 11. For a further discussion, see Daniel J.H. Greenwood, Democracy and Delaware: The Puzzle of Corpo-
rate Law 25-27 (draft of June 14, 2002). 
 12. Deborah A. DeMott, Perspectives on Choice of Law for Corporate Internal Affairs, 48 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS., 161-62 (Summer 1985). 
 13. See, e.g., P. John Kozyris, Corporate Wars and Choice of Law, 1985 DUKE L.J. 1; Jack L. Goldsmith 
III, Interest Analysis Applied to Corporations: The Unprincipled Use of a Choice of Law Method, 98 YALE L.J. 
597, 599 (1988). 
 14. For an excellent, current example, see Greenwood, supra note 11. 
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the governing law for the behavior.15  Yet the internal affairs doctrine allows a state 
that is hardly affected by the corporate behavior at issue to dictate the rules governing 
that behavior.16  Of all the areas of law that control and limit corporations, including 
contract law, tort law, environmental law, and labor law, it is only corporate law that 
is left to the corporation itself to choose.  And like those other areas of law, the rules 
of corporate governance affect more than the parties embodied in the corporate char-
ter.  From the standpoint of democratic legitimacy, it is no more justifiable to allow 
corporations to choose which state provides their corporate governance laws than it is 
to allow such corporations to choose which state ought to provide the tort law or envi-
ronmental law that governs them. 
Consider the supreme oddity of the internal affairs rule: A corporation headquar-
tered in New York, with all of its facilities, employees, and shareholders in New York, 
and with all or most of its business in New York, will have its rules of corporate gov-
ernance provided not by the state of New York, but rather by the state where its incor-
porators secured a charter, usually Delaware.  The internal affairs doctrine then says 
that Delaware law will govern such a corporation even if New York wants to exert its 
authority over the internal affairs of the corporation, and even if a claim arises in a 
New York court.  While this example might appear extreme, it is a common applica-
tion of the doctrine.  In essence, the internal affairs doctrine allows Delaware to reach 
into the courts of other states and apply its own law to disputes between residents of 
other states regarding corporations that have little or no contact with Delaware. 
Corporate law should not promote this odd result.  Rather, the conflict rules for 
corporate governance should be consistent with the conflict rules in other areas of law: 
The state that has the greatest interest in regulating the internal affairs of a corporation 
should provide the rules for corporate governance.  The application of such a simple, 
straightforward, and consistent rule would bring about fundamental changes in the 
way corporate law is provided in the United States.  Instead of being an area of law 
uniquely insulated from democratic pressures, corporate law would become subject to 
the same political pressures as other areas of the law. 
 15. See Goldsmith, supra note 13, at 599 (noting choice of law rules “generally provide[] that a court faced 
with a choice of law problem should initially look to the policies expressed in the purportedly conflicting state 
laws in order to assess the extent of each state’s interest in having its law apply to the particular case”); see also 
Kozyris, supra note 13, at 16-17 (“In the new conflicts calculus, the interests and policies of the forum state, 
especially the protection of forum domiciliaries, weigh heavily in favor of applying its law. . . .  Fixed, single-
factor, content-blind, forum-neutral rules are supposed to be particularly obnoxious because they defer auto-
matically and totally to one legal system in disregard of the interests and policies of the other states of contact.  
The [internal affairs rule] is precisely such a rule.”). 
 16. One might say that Delaware cares a great deal about regulating the behavior at issue, but a state’s de-
sire to regulate, without more, does not constitute a genuine interest.  Delaware’s desire to regulate springs from 
the fact that without such power, it cannot dominate the market for corporate charters.  Such a desire should not 
be material in the conflicts-interest analysis, since it is a desire that many, if not all, other states share.  Rather, 
the analysis should ask whether the act of gaining a corporate charter from Delaware’s Secretary of State gives 
Delaware a greater state interest in regulating the internal affairs of a corporation than a state where, for exam-
ple, the corporation is headquartered, or where most of the corporation’s employees or shareholders are located. 
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II 
A HYPOTHETICAL STATUTE 
Let us imagine that a particular state legislature, in Massachusetts for example, be-
lieves that corporations consistently undervalue the interests of their employees, espe-
cially when corporations consider fundamental decisions such as a merger, acquisi-
tion, or major sale of assets.  In such a context, Massachusetts might consider the 
following statute: 
Regardless of where such a corporation is chartered, the directors of: 
a. a corporation that employs 51% or more of its employees within Massachusetts; or 
b. a corporation that employs more employees within Massachusetts than in any other state 
or political subdivision of the United States or other nation; 
shall consider the interests of the corporation’s employees in making decisions that have a 
material effect on the level of the corporation’s present or future employment.  Such a duty 
shall be deemed satisfied if the board of directors includes at least one member who is elected 
by hourly-wage employees rather than shareholders. 
Undoubtedly, this statute purports to regulate the internal affairs of certain corpo-
rations. Furthermore, this statute almost certainly conflicts with Delaware law—
Delaware law requires corporate directors to owe an “unyielding” duty to the corpora-
tion and its shareholders.17  This legal duty is interpreted to bar the consideration of 
employee interests except when necessary to further shareholder interests.18  Addition-
ally, this hypothetical Massachusetts statute conflicts with the Delaware requirement 
that directors be elected by shareholders.19
Let us now imagine a case arising under this statute.  A Massachusetts employee 
of a corporation sues in Massachusetts court to enjoin a planned merger of that corpo-
ration with another.  The employee shows that the majority of the corporation’s em-
ployees reside in Massachusetts and that the corporation’s directors have refused to 
consider the interests of the employees in the merger negotiations. 
The corporation will file a motion to dismiss, saying that it is chartered in Dela-
ware and that Delaware law governs its internal affairs.  But should the suit be dis-
missed?  At first glance, the answer seems to be an easy “yes.”  The statute purports to 
regulate the internal affairs of corporations incorporated in Delaware; if the internal 
 17. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985); see also Katz v. Oak Indus. Inc., 508 A.2d 873, 
879 (Del. Ch. 1986) (holding that the obligation of directors is to “maximize” interests of shareholders). 
 18. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1986) (holding that the 
“board may have regard for various constituencies in discharging its responsibilities, provided there are ration-
ally related benefits accruing to the stockholders”).  Note that Delaware law had feinted toward the allowance 
of such consideration, cf. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985) (implying that 
directors could take into account interests of constituencies other than stockholders in defending against hostile 
takeovers), before retreating in Revlon.  Some scholars believe that Delaware law does not require shareholder 
interests to be maximized.  See, e.g., Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corpo-
rate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247, 305 (1999) (lending support to the argument that “treating directors as trustees 
charged with serving interests above and beyond those of shareholders in fact can be in shareholders’ ‘long-run 
interests’”).  But even if not, there is little doubt that the above statute would be deemed to be in conflict with 
Delaware law. 
 19. DEL. CODE ANN. Tit. 8, § 211 (2001). 
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affairs doctrine controls, then the statute would not be valid and the case should be 
dismissed. 
Few corporate lawyers or corporate law scholars would contest the suit’s dis-
missal.  The internal affairs doctrine is, as noted above, one of the foundational prin-
ciples of corporate law.  It has been remarkably immune from attack.  It is even the 
subject of a special section of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict-of-Laws, which is 
often quoted as saying that “Issues involving the rights and liabilities of a corpora-
tion . . . are determined by the . . . local law of the state of incorporation.”20
In fact, the internal affairs doctrine is so embedded that this statute would likely 
not be passed by a state legislature in the first place.  Few would think of such regula-
tion as feasible.  Nevertheless, there is an economic argument for this kind of statute 
and a democratic argument for this kind of statute, and these arguments are remarka-
bly similar.21
III 
THE ECONOMIC ARGUMENT FOR THE HYPOTHETICAL STATUTE 
The economic argument is straightforward.  It focuses on externalities, which are 
routinely cited as a cause of inefficient decisions and thus a rationale for government 
regulation.  Indeed, the internal affairs doctrine is easily characterized as an “external-
ity machine.”22  Under the internal affairs doctrine, states compete for corporate char-
ters on the basis of which state can provide a set of laws most beneficial to the deci-
sion makers—that is, directors and shareholders.  Even if this competition is viewed 
as a “race to the top” that maximizes the interests of shareholders, the economic inter-
ests of other stakeholders are not taken into account by the jurisdiction providing the 
rules.  This is a consequence of the fact that these other stakeholders have no say in 
the decision as to where to incorporate.  In other words, the jurisdictions competing 
for corporate charters have no incentive to take into account the economic interests of 
other corporate stakeholders, even though those other stakeholders undoubtedly are 
affected by the terms of the corporate charter.23
When certain stakeholders (for example, employees and communities) lack politi-
cal clout in the jurisdiction making the rules, that jurisdiction can construct laws that 
benefit the corporate decisionmakers at the expense of those other stakeholders.  And 
the jurisdiction in question can do so at no cost to itself.  This is a classic example of 
externalities: the state can internalize the benefits of its manager- and shareholder-
 20. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT-OF-LAWS § 302 (1971).  But this quote is misleading.  The full 
text of the section includes an important caveat: The law of the state of incorporation will be applied “except in 
the unusual case, with respect to the particular issue, some other state has a more significant relationship to the 
occurrence and the parties, in which event the local law of the other state will be applied.”  Id. 
 21. For the purposes of this essay I am making the reasonable assumption that there is no constitutional 
underpinning of the internal affairs doctrine.  The best examination of this point is Jed Rubenfeld, State Take-
over Legislation and the Commerce Clause: The “Foreign” Corporations Problem, 36 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 355, 
357 (1988). 
 22. To paraphrase LAWRENCE MITCHELL, CORPORATE IRRESPONSIBILITY (2001). 
 23. See Bebchuck, supra note 3, at 1485 (“[I]f the rule is designed by the states, then the competition 
among them will lead state officials to exclude consideration of [third party] interests.”). 
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centric corporate governance rules while externalizing most of the costs onto power-
less stakeholders.  Consequently, these externalities lead to state laws that fail to 
maximize social welfare.24
Law and economics scholars would suggest that states can maximize social wel-
fare by imagining what various parties would agree to, absent transaction costs.  If that 
is the model, then the internal affairs doctrine almost certainly results in a less socially 
optimal legal framework since the jurisdiction need not consider any parties other than 
those who have a hand in choosing where to incorporate.  The hypothetical, socially 
optimal negotiation has all stakeholders at the table.  The real negotiation has only a 
few. 
Indeed, it is difficult to imagine how, given the internal affairs doctrine, a state 
could craft a socially optimal corporate governance framework.  Suppose, for exam-
ple, a state sought to create a corporate governance rule (such as the hypothetical stat-
ute above) that would take into account the interests of nonshareholder stakeholders.  
In response, shareholders and managers would likely move their corporations to other 
states with more shareholder-centric governance regimes.  This is possible under the 
internal affairs doctrine because shareholders face no serious consequences for mov-
ing to another jurisdiction to choose a different set of corporate laws.  Consequently, 
because of the internal affairs doctrine, “the state [trying to protect non-shareholder 
constituencies] may both lose its incorporations and fail to achieve any protection of 
third parties’ interests.”25
This argument against the internal affairs doctrine assumes that the socially opti-
mal level of public regulation is not zero.  States, localities, and the federal govern-
ment are charged with regulating the public and private spheres in order to maximize 
social welfare.  Governments care, as they should, about crafting the proper mix of 
regulation to reach certain social goals in the most efficient way.  Even if one cares 
only about economic well-being, governments must routinely step into the market to 
adjust for market defects such as monopolies, insufficient information, obstacles to 
negotiation, and (yes) externalities.  Over time, governments learn which policy tools 
are more efficient than others in reaching public policy objectives.  One way that gov-
ernments learn is feedback from the citizenry.  To quote Justice Louis Brandeis, states 
are the “laboratories of novel social and economic experiments.”26  When a state tries 
a new regulatory initiative and is successful in maximizing social welfare, the state 
and its officials receive certain benefits as a consequence of the policy (for example, 
an influx of people into the state or reelection of officials).  When a state makes a mis-
take, the feedback is negative (a decrease in population or failure to be reelected). 
Now note that the unique trait of the internal affairs doctrine is that this opportu-
nity to provide feedback on corporate law is available only to the corporation itself.  If 
the corporation benefits from a state’s regulation of corporate governance, then the 
corporation reacts positively by incorporating in that state.  If the corporation does not 
 24. See id. (“When externalities are present . . . rules that maximize shareholder value may well diverge 
from the socially desirable ones.”). 
 25. Id. at 1486. 
 26. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
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benefit, then the corporation reacts negatively and incorporates elsewhere.  Because 
the corporation alone is free to incorporate in another state, no other stakeholder af-
fected by the rules of corporate governance has the opportunity to influence the state’s 
policy through feedback. 
This result diverges from that which is socially optimal.  By any reasonable as-
sumption, a socially optimal law of corporate governance would take into account the 
interests of parties other than shareholders and managers.  The internal affairs doctrine 
all but makes that impossible and thus guarantees that corporate law will fall short of 
optimal. 
Nor is the optimal result reached even if one assumes, as do many corporate 
scholars, that the concerns of nonshareholder constituencies should be left to bodies of 
law other than corporate law (such as labor and employment law, environmental law, 
or consumer protection law).  A state seeking to create a socially optimal system of 
regulation for corporations doing business within its jurisdiction but not chartered 
there will have fewer regulatory options at its disposal.  As long as the internal affairs 
doctrine applies, changes in corporate governance will be unavailable.  Fewer regula-
tory options usually result in less efficient and more costly regulation, resulting in a 
move away from social optimality. 
This argument is further illustrated if we analogize the “internal affairs” doctrine 
to another area of law—for example, environmental law.  Imagine that Delaware al-
lowed companies to come to it and, for a fee, receive permits to increase sulfur diox-
ide emissions, or to log in old growth forests, or to construct shopping malls in open 
spaces.  Furthermore, these permits would have legal force regardless of where these 
activities would occur.  Such a regime would be disastrous.  No one would suggest 
that Delaware was engaging in a “race to the top” in environmental protection.  Nor 
would anyone suggest that the end result was the most efficient because states could 
compete on the basis of what permits to offer. 
Indeed, if Delaware attempted to adopt such a doctrine, other states would object 
strenuously.  For the same reasons, states should object to Delaware’s dominance in 
corporate law. 
IV 
THE DEMOCRATIC ARGUMENT FOR THE HYPOTHETICAL STATUTE 
The democratic argument is strikingly similar.  The difference is that in addition to 
being inconsistent with social welfare, the internal affairs doctrine is inconsistent with 
democratic legitimacy.  The internal affairs doctrine allows Delaware to insulate its 
laws from democratic pressures by allowing corporations to take advantage of Dela-
ware’s laws of corporate governance without subjecting themselves to the other laws 
of the state.  Corporations located outside of Delaware can adopt Delaware’s laws for 
their internal affairs, leaving non-shareholder stakeholders affected by those laws but 
with no democratic mechanism to influence those laws. 
This is not true with regard to any other area of law.  It is possible, of course, for 
two or more states to have conflicting laws on a specific subject, or to have the laws of 
one state affect the citizens of another.  For example, the tort law of a given state will 
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affect the citizens of other states whenever they travel within the given state.  But 
typical conflict-of-laws notions exist to resolve such disputes, and these notions, 
which balance the interests of states in regulating behavior, embody important democ-
ratic principles. 
When state laws are in conflict, one reason why the governing law comes from the 
state with the greatest interest in regulating the behavior is that such law typically has 
a better democratic pedigree.  A state may have an interest in regulation because it is 
the site of the behavior at issue, or because most of the people regulated are residents 
there.  Regardless, the state that has the greatest interest in a specific dispute will, al-
most by definition, be subject to democratic pressures with regard to the law at issue. 
Indeed, there is value in recognizing the interest of the state in which political ac-
countability is maximized.  If the legislature or courts “get it wrong” in making regu-
latory decisions, it is much easier to correct the mistake when the state has within its 
borders those whose behavior is regulated or those who bear the costs or gain the 
benefits of the regulation.  More to the point, one would not expect a state whose in-
terest in regulating the behavior at issue derives only from the desire to gain incorpo-
ration fees to have the appropriate democratic incentives to correct missteps within the 
regulatory framework. 
There is an even more fundamental point.  At some level, politics is about con-
structing a community.  And according to democratic theory, the rules of the commu-
nity should be enacted either by the community itself or by representatives who are 
subject to community oversight.  Those who live in such a community are deemed to 
have voluntarily subjected themselves to that community’s laws.  One can have a say 
in the laws of the community as long as one consents to be governed by those laws.  
The laws of one community should not be thrust on another without the consent of the 
other. 
Under this simple construct, the internal affairs doctrine is open to attack.  Corpo-
rations are already insulated from the influence of the community because of the im-
personal nature of the corporate form, which separates the firm’s decisionmakers from 
the legal and cultural norms that influence behavior.  The internal affairs doctrine 
makes this problem worse by allowing corporate elites to choose the law that governs 
not only their interactions among themselves, but also many of their interactions with 
others.  If a community (read: state) were to attempt to regulate the affairs of a corpo-
ration within its borders, the corporation could simply reincorporate in another juris-
diction.  In the usual situation, if someone wants to avoid the laws of a community, 
she has to leave the community, thereby giving up the benefits of living in that com-
munity.  The internal affairs doctrine, however, allows a corporation to opt out with-
out leaving, thus allowing it to have its cake and devour it as well. 
One response to this argument is that the other stakeholders are not at all left 
without remedies.  Just because workers, creditors, or consumers cannot affect the in-
ternal affairs of a company is not to say they have no recourse.  Moreover, other 
stakeholders still have significant market power.  For example, if employees desire to 
be treated better, they need not change existing internal affairs rules to have directors 
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owe them a fiduciary duty.  They need only exert their desires in the marketplace, ei-
ther by going to other firms or by threatening to do so. 
These responses leave the issue unresolved, however.  One could imagine, for ex-
ample, that the best way for workers to protect their interests is to require a representa-
tive on the board of directors.  But the internal affairs doctrine once again serves as an 
obstacle: even if all of a company’s workers lived in one state, that state could not im-
pose such a requirement on a company that was incorporated elsewhere.  Under the 
internal affairs doctrine, gaining a worker representative on the board would require a 
successful vote of the shareholders, which is highly doubtful.  Of course, Delaware 
law could be changed to require a worker representative, but this seems even less 
likely. 
Nor is it a response to the democratic legitimacy critique to say that other stake-
holders retain market power.  Democracy is not the market, nor vice versa.  The mar-
ket is available as a recourse whether the internal affairs doctrine is in place or not.  
Often, the best way to protect one’s interests is not through the market but through the 
political process.  Yet the internal affairs doctrine places the governance of corpora-
tions beyond the reaches of the political process, except, of course, to the political 
process of Delaware.  And because few corporations are actually based in Delaware, 
no one—certainly not the Delaware citizenry who pay fewer taxes thanks to the many 
corporations enticed to incorporate there—has an interest in looking out for the inter-
ests of corporate stakeholders elsewhere in the nation. 
V 
CONCLUSION 
Of course, much remains to be said.  Certainly, arguments could be advanced in 
favor of Delaware’s dominance.  And perhaps it would be preferable—if democratiza-
tion of corporate law is the goal—to look to federalization of corporate charters rather 
than to the end of the internal affairs doctrine.  Regardless, the point here is that the 
power of the internal affairs doctrine is so ingrained in corporate law scholarship that 
it deserves far greater attention. 
I believe the internal affairs doctrine is open to serious challenge.  I believe it is 
best seen as simply an exception to conflict-of-laws rules; an exception that could be 
easily discarded by state courts while adjudicating cases under statutes such as the one 
proposed earlier in this essay.27  In other words, a state that has significant interests in 
the internal affairs of corporations doing business in that state can pass corporate gov-
ernance statutes such as that suggested above.  When claims arise under these statutes, 
the state can assert its interest in court as it could in any other circumstance in which it 
had a significant interest in regulating the behavior at issue.  A state may not always 
be able to convince a judge that its interests are the most significant and that its law 
 27. A possibility assumed in the Restatement as well.  See supra note 20.  I am also making the reasonable 
assumption here that the internal affairs doctrine is not required by the Constitution.  See Jed Rubenfeld, State 
Takeover Legislation and the Commerce Clause: The “Foreign” Corporations Problem, 36 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 
355 (1988). 
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should apply.  But if typical conflict-of-laws rules were to apply, the state would 
sometimes win.  That would, at least, be more often than the state wins now, which is 
never. 
In relaxing the constraints of the internal affairs doctrine, corporate law would be-
come more accountable to the states in which the corporations themselves enjoy the 
benefits of the social and legal fabric.  That would be a good thing. 
